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The Economics of Mandatory Biotech
Food Labeling in the United States
William J. Gongol
ABSTRACT. Almost every developed nation in the world except the United States
mandates the labeling of genetically modified foods. Upon examining the costs and
benefits of mandatory labeling, it appears that this may not be the most efficient solution
to deal with varied consumer preferences. The United States government should instead
focus on increased scientific research to deal with the externalities of biotechnology.

I. Introduction
Soon her eye fell on a little glass box that was lying under the
table: she opened it, and found in it a very small cake, on which
the words “EAT ME” were beautifully marked in currants.
“Well, I'll eat it,” said Alice, “and if it makes me grow larger, I
can reach the key; and if it makes me grow smaller, I can creep
under the door; so either way I'll get into the garden, and I don't
care which happens!”
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
Were Alice to return to that rabbit hole today, she would likely find a
cake bearing a different message: “EAT ME (Contains Genetically
Modified Organisms).” In the past twenty years, advances in
biotechnology have brought genetically-engineered foods out of the
laboratory and into the kitchen. To call a food “genetically modified” or
“biotech” is imprecise because virtually every foodstuff in the world has
been hybridized, mutated, or otherwise adapted from its original genetic
form over the course of organized human agriculture. What distinguishes
biotechnology from conventional breeding is that biotechnology involves
direct manipulation of the genes in a clinical setting, rather than the
conventional hands-on cross-breeding of our ancestors. Food crops are
genetically modified for a variety of reasons, such as productivity,
hardiness, and resistance to pests and pesticides.
In 2004, biotech crops comprised 45% of corn yields and 85% of
soybean yields in the United States [U.S. Department of Agriculture,
2004, 24-25]. Political pressure, especially from environmental activist
47
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groups, has led the European Union, Russia, and many other countries to
mandate biotech food labeling. In the United States, labeling is voluntary,
but there is considerable pressure from special interest groups to make it
mandatory. When placed under scrutiny, though, the case for mandatory
biotech labeling falls apart. The United States should continue to avoid
mandatory biotech labeling until and unless a significantly better cause
to do so can be found.

II. Why Use Biotechnology?
Even before Gregor Mendel discovered the rudiments of plant and animal
genetics, humans have adapted their foods to suit the available
agricultural conditions. Modern corn, even without clinical genetic
modifications, is a far cry from the inedible grasses from which it
evolved. That evolution took place under the guidance and with the
intervention of human farmers. For the past few decades, biologists have
employed biotechnology to study plant genomes and to genetically
modify plant and animal life. Biotechnology has increased crop yields,
improved the nutritional content of foods, and improved crop resistance
to pesticides and herbicides. Simply put, biotechnology allows biologists
to attempt genetic modifications without having to wait out the call and
response of mutation and natural selection, and it provides powerful aids
in the quest to preserve favorable characteristics from generation to
generation. Opponents of biotechnology denounce it as “playing God.”
That opposition, however powerfully phrased, fails a critical test of logic:
It assumes that humans are better off in a state of nature than with the
advantages of technology and innovation. But all the gene-splicing in the
world does not end up on our plates indiscriminately; biotech foods are
heavily regulated.

III. Current Information Regulations
Contrary to the myth of unregulated “Frankenfoods,” the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) all monitor aspects of the safety
of biotech crops in the United States. The USDA monitors the safety of
meat and dairy products, the FDA monitors all other foods and their
derivatives, and the EPA monitors the environmental ramifications of
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biotech crops, particularly those with built-in resistance to pesticides.
The efforts of these three organizations are coordinated under the
authority of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s
Biotechnology Regulatory Services.
Since 1992, the Food and Drug Administration has mandated the
following:
•

•

•
•

If a bioengineered food is significantly different from its
traditional counterpart such that the common or usual name no
longer adequately describes the new food, the name must be
changed to describe the difference.
If an issue exists for the food or a constituent of the food
regarding how the food is used or consequences of its use, a
statement must be made on the label to describe the issue.
If a bioengineered food has a significantly different nutritional
property, its label must reflect the difference.
If a new food includes an allergen that consumers would not
expect to be present based on the name of the food, the presence
of that allergen must be disclosed on the label. [Food and Drug
Administration, 2001, para. 5].

Notably, these regulations call attention only to empirical differences
between food products; they do not call attention to the genetic
modifications themselves. Few biotech foods on the market in the United
States bear mandatory labels since most biotech foods are substantively
the same as their non-biotech counterparts, at least in the eyes of US
regulators [Golan, et al., 2000, 33].
According to former FDA commissioner Jane E. Henney, “We are not
aware of any information that foods developed through genetic
engineering differ as a class in quality, safety, or any other attribute from
foods developed through conventional means” [qtd. in Thompson, 2000,
para. 42]. For this reason, the USDA keeps its regulatory scope within
the realm of the empirical. Government mandated labeling “[leads] to
additional bureaucracy, which acts similar to a tariff in its effect on trade
volumes” [Huang, et al., 2004, 47]. Additionally, government-issued
labels implicitly condemn or endorse product types, causing an exogenous
shift in demand. This reveals one of the most important factors in the
labeling debate: The argument is as much about political power as it is
about real consumer choice and safety.
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While regulators have deemed the modified foods “not significantly
different” from their non-GMO counterparts, critics have countered that
even slight modifications to the genetic makeup of a crop can have
unintended consequences. Ordinarily, it would be perfectly rational
behavior to anticipate unintended consequences, but in the case of
genetically-modified foods, opponents assume an unjustifiably high
probability of a diverse array of catastrophic consequences. Further, they
have proven themselves adept at exploiting public fears rather than
educating and informing rational consumer choice. Mandatory labeling
of genetically-modified foods is seen by biotech opponents not as a true
conveyor of useful market information, but rather as a governmentsubsidized method of propagandizing their case against the companies
who use biotechnology.

IV. To Label, or Not To Label Biotech Foods
To understand the economic ramifications of biotech labeling regulations,
we must first understand the costs and benefits of labeling in the absence
of regulations. Producers of biotech foods with clear benefits such as
better nutritional value or flavor voluntarily label their products as such.
This is because consumers are willing to accept biotech foods when they
perceive clear, strong personal benefits from doing so [Grunert, et al.,
2004, 105]. Examples of this include Flav’r Sav’r tomatoes which are
engineered to have a long shelf life and Golden Rice which is infused
with vitamin A to help curb blindness in the developing world.
Conversely, when the benefits of biotech products are absorbed by the
producer or are mainly characteristics not easily verified by the consumer,
producers tend not to label their foods as biotech. “As long as consumers
perceive GM technology to carry no benefits for them, or only benefits
for producers, or as long as the benefits claimed are perceived to be
abstract and distant, the negative attitudes existing will probably remain
stable” [Grunert, et al., 2004, 105]. The best-known example in the
United States is the Roundup-Ready family of food crops, which have
been genetically altered to improve crop resistance to a powerful and
widely-used herbicide. While Roundup-Ready crops are touted for their
high yields, they have no characteristics that make them more appealing
to the consumer.
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V. Labeling Non-Biotech Foods
Despite the apparently low probability of actual harm to the consumer
from the consumption of genetically-modified foods, some consumers
will still place value on knowing which foods have been modified through
biotechnology. This presents an opportunity for producers who may
choose to raise and specifically label their non-biotech foods. Those
producers may derive surplus benefit from the premiums paid for nonbiotech crops, as well as by selling to markets in biotech-averse regions
like Japan and the European Union. They may also benefit from
favorable public relations. Some companies such as Gerber have already
capitalized on this opportunity by eradicating biotech ingredients from
baby food – though it should be noted they did so without scientific
reason [Golan, et al., 2000, 34].
In order to maintain non-biotech crop integrity, those crops must be
segregated from others that contain genetic modifications. The burden
naturally falls upon the non-biotech producers as long as it is legal to
raise biotech crops. To slow the spread of cross-pollination, non-biotech
farmers must plant all-male border rows, which is a sub-optimal use of
land [Bullock and Desquilbet, 2002, 85]. It may, in fact, be impossible
to completely segregate biotech crops from those not containing genetic
modifications; for this reason tolerance levels are given to measure the
relative “contamination” of a non-GM crop by GMO’s. The lower the
official tolerance of biotech levels acceptable in non-biotech crops is, the
greater the cost of segregation. Another cost of segregating crops comes
from additional equipment cleaning or dedicating separate equipment for
treating biotech and non-biotech crops. These are clear, measurable costs
of production; however, non-GMO crops have been found to be much
more costly to raise than these production costs account for. Bullock and
Desquilbet found that the costs of segregation and identity preservation
accounted for only a small portion of the premium paid on non-biotech
crops. They concluded that the main cost unique to producing nonbiotech crops was the forgone revenue from producing more efficient
biotech crops [2002, 95]. Farmers raising biotech crops experience
higher crop yields and lower pesticide costs, creating a distinct
opportunity cost to the production of non-GMO crops.

VI. Mandatory Labeling
Government-mandated labeling of biotech and non-biotech foods can only
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be effective if it has consistent, achievable standards for producers. Also,
the labels must convey their messages clearly and concisely to consumers
[Golan, et al., 2000, 36]. To increase social welfare, the social benefits
from this process would have to exceed the social costs by at least the
administration costs. The FDA and USDA are already in the business of
sorting out which foods are safe and which are unsafe for consumption;
mandatory labeling policies posit that society can somehow gain more
from delineating safe foods further into categories whose use is
speculative at best.
By the USDA’s own admission, the act of labeling food
characteristics fails to improve social welfare unless the socially-optimal
outcome is clear. Consumers and the FDA found a clear social benefit to
labels for dolphin-safe tuna and uniform nutrition fact labeling [Golan, et
al., 2000, 21-24]. In the case of biotech foods, however, no sociallyoptimal market result is clear. Without the mandate of a socially-optimal
market structure, comprehensive labeling of genetically-modified foods
fails the litmus test established by the FDA and embarks on a whole new
labeling policy without precedent.

VII. When to Label
USDA economists have found that mandatory food labeling can be
socially beneficial if:
Standards, testing, certification and enforcement can be
established
Information is clear and concise
Consumer preferences differ
Information on the product enhances consumer safety
No political consensus exists [Golan, et al., 2000, 17-18]
When information about product use enhances the safety of the consumer,
it can be socially beneficial to mandate labeling. To this end, the USDA
mandates safe handling labels on meat which tell if the meat is fully
cooked or if not, and to what temperature the meat needs to be heated for
safe consumption. This policy is socially beneficial; all consumers
benefit from understanding the safety implications of the food they eat to
a degree that more than justifies the costs of administrating these labels.
This concern does not apply to biotech labeling because all
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commensurable safety risks of biotech foods are already considered by
the USDA, FDA, and EPA.
The government has found it socially beneficial to mandate nutrition
fact labeling. This is because consumer preferences differ while the
social benefit of choosing one good over another is less clear. For
example, some consumers want to eat as little fat as possible; others want
to eat as little sodium as possible. Through mandating nutrition fact
labeling, the government provides a uniform system by which each
consumer can assess the costs and benefits of consuming any particular
food. This way, all consumers can benefit from better information about
the content of their food without a specific endorsement of any one good
over another.
Studies show that consumers often feel better about buying nonbiotech foods [Grunert, et al,, 2004, 103], but this does not mean that this
behavior is socially beneficial. When it is beneficial as a marketing tool
for producers to advertise as non-biotech, they do so already. At the same
time, when biotech foods hold tangible benefits for consumers, the
producers already have an incentive to label their foods as such.
Another way in which information on foods gets out is through
unfolding. This is to say that some producers will voluntarily label their
goods non-biotech or biotech and others will follow suit since the absence
of such a label would imply their dereliction in regard to the claim. If a
consumer walks though a produce aisle in a store and sees four varieties
of non-biotech bananas, only three of which are labeled “non-biotech,”
the consumer is wont to assume that the fourth is bio-engineered. To
avoid such a charge, the fourth producer is likely to label his food as nonbiotech as well [Golan, et al., 2000, 8].
The present market inefficiency, which means that not all foods are
voluntarily labeled either “biotech” or “non-biotech,” is that consumers
have been persuaded to perceive a risk to individual health and well-being
that is neither justified by the science nor fully informed enough to
engage scientifically. Consumers are notoriously apprehensive about two
categories of goods: What they put in their bodies and what they put on
their bodies. This intrinsic apprehension is so large and so emotional that
it requires a confounding degree of scientific certainty to persuade
consumers otherwise–a degree of certainty which biotechnology is unable
to supply. Simultaneously, consumers are incapable of internalizing the
costs of not using biotechnology, specifically, the risk of global
starvation.

54

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2005

Effects like this temper the potential for social benefit from
mandating labeling. For mandatory labeling to be a viable option, the
benefits of doing so must exceed the administration costs. Furthermore,
a calculation of the benefit from mandating labeling must only consider
the additional benefit reaped from labeling foods which were not already
labeled. Mandatory labeling by producers is severely complicated by two
factors: First, most candidate crops for genetic modifications are
commodity goods, making them poor candidates for market
differentiation. Second, depending upon the strictness of the tolerance
levels for GM presence in non-GM foods, full compliance with labeling
procedures may in fact require a duplicate and parallel production chain
to fully segregate GM foods from non-GM foods. This imposes an
extraordinarily burdensome capital investment cost, which is
disproportionately incident upon a commodity industry.
The prospect of creating standards, testing, and certification of levels
of genetically modified foods by the US government is a weighty
consideration. Meanwhile, many private organizations who oppose the
proliferation of biotechnology already keep track of genetically modified
organisms in commercially-available foods. Mandating biotech labeling
without banning the use of biotechnology would impose an undue cost on
producers of non-biotech foods who want to retain their non-biotech
labels. This is because the burden of segregating non-biotech crops
would rest entirely on them so as to retain genetically modified organism
levels under the official tolerance.
The USDA’s guidelines say that information on labels must be clear
and concise, or consumers will not read them. Unclear labels fail to
defray information and search costs of consumers. As should be clear by
this point, the issue of genetic modifications is anything but clear or
concise. The lack of scientific consensus on the implications of genetic
modifications and the lack of consumer consensus about what constitutes
a “safe” genetically-modified food combine to render such a labeling
effort impossible.
Mandatory labeling can also be a cop-out when there is no political
or scientific consensus as to the costs and benefits of the consumption of
a food. Dolphin-safe tuna labels emerged from one such episode. While
many lobbied to protect the dolphin population, the government could not
ban the tuna due to tariffs and other laws. The reason this worked was
because no compelling case was made by opponents that protecting
dolphins was not socially beneficial. In the case of biotechnology, many
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argue that though there is no scientific consensus on the safety of biotech
foods, we should label them to appease importers from other countries.
However, importers of our foods already tend to have private negotiations
regarding biotech content of foods and independent organization such as
Greenpeace already monitor the content, so it is unlikely that mandating
labels domestically will have a great effect on American exports.
In 2000, 60% of all processed foods in the United States contained
some bioengineered component. Despite the enormous market involved
and the nearly-universal adoption of those biotech foods, there has been
no evidence found of widespread consumer harm. Meanwhile, scientists
have developed such biotech foods as Golden Rice, which has been
engineered to deliver high levels of beta-carotene to curb childhood
blindness in the developing world. It would be difficult to overstate the
potential social benefit from infusing our foods with vitamins and
minerals in which we are deficient. Biotech research is far from over, and
as with all new technologies, we can rationally expect it to become more
advanced and precise with time.
While the social benefits from biotechnology, both to consumers and
producers, are evident, we have yet to identify and measure massive
unforeseen costs. Opponents can point to no evidence of widespread
birth defects, crop failures, or other forms of measurable harm attributable
to biotechnology. Opposition to biotechnology remains a “could be”
argument, while the technology itself has already delivered significant
social benefits. Even the most prominent failure of the biotech era has
proven to be nothing more than a hypothetical case of risk. StarLink was
a biotech corn that was constructed with an internal pesticide. It was
accepted for use in animal feeds, but not for human consumption. On
September 18, 2000, the Washington Post published an exposé alleging
that StarLink was found in Kraft’s Taco Bell brand taco shells. The next
day, the FDA received around fifty complaints from consumers claiming
illness derived from consuming the taco shells. While most claims turned
out to be treatable allergic reactions not necessarily related to the corn,
StarLink was taken off the market. Despite the absence of any
measurable harm, the FDA stopped accepting as animal feeds biotech
foods not accepted for human consumption [Centers for Disease Control,
2001, 3-5].

VIII. Externalities
Finally, let us address the remaining argument against the proliferation of
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biotechnology: externalities. We cannot say with 100% certainty that
biotech foods are categorically safe. However, biotech food can be (and
presently are) held to the same safety standards to which we hold all other
foods for consumption.
Some suggest that biotech foods are likely to cause birth defects, the
evolution of superdiseases, and any other number of cataclysms.
Superdiseases, or diseases with extraordinary resistance to existing
treatments, could mutate within or due to genetically-modified foods,
particularly those modified for resistance to pesticides. This risk,
however, is not peculiar to biotech foods; hospitals already encounter this
hazard completely outside the realm of bio-engineered foods. Those
foods at risk for superdiseases are already monitored with the same regard
as the pesticides themselves, rendering it redundant to condemn biotech
foods on these grounds.
Since it is impossible to prove a negative, it cannot be proven with
complete certainty that biotechnology will not cause birth defects, plague,
or other unforeseen catastrophes. Since biotech foods have the potential
to cause problems like this, they most certainly present a market
externality. The evidence so far, though, is that the risks of these
cataclysms are very low, while the measurable social benefits are in fact
quite great. Furthermore, many of the benefits of biotechnology can be
used to offset the harm created when natural catastrophes occur quite
without the aid of biotechnology itself. We cannot be certain that the
global crop of genetically-modified rice might not someday fail in one
terrible event; however, we can be certain that higher yields of some
hybrids of rice can be used to offset the damage and hunger caused by
natural disasters like typhoons and droughts.
Overall, though, mandatory labels fail to redress externalities.
Assuming that the externality was well-defined and negative, mandatory
labeling would fail to attain the socially-optimal outcome because of freeriders. Most genetic modifications are not made in laboratories, but
rather in the wild by cross-pollination and evolution. Cross-pollination
makes it practically impossible to perfectly segregate non-biotech crops.
Hypothetically, mandatory labeling will reduce the demand for biotech
foods, thus increasing the demand for non-biotech foods and causing
biotech producers to internalize some of the non-biotech producers’
segregation costs. Another possible solution would be to establish
“[b]iotech cultivation regulations (for example, boundaries and refuges)
and well-defined property rights …to [control] the potential
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environmental externalities…” [Golan, et al., 2000, 36]. However, the
nature of biotech externalities is purely speculative, and if there is nothing
categorically wrong with biotech crops, this places an undue burden on
biotech producers who are otherwise increasing the quality and efficiency
of the food industry as a whole.

IX. A different answer
If we demand additional government intervention in the case of
biotechnology, the only egalitarian manner in which to do so would be
through the promotion of scientific research and education as to the costs
and benefits of biotechnology. If biotech foods pose a dire threat to
humanity, we have two ways of finding out: through maintaining the
status quo and waiting for a horrible disaster to happen or through
increased scientific research into the effects of biotechnology. If biotech
foods do not categorically threaten life as we know it, increased scientific
research will help us to continue to make safer, more efficient, more
nutritious foods.

X. Country of origin labels
The U.S. government has already shot down the prospect of country of
origin labeling on foods. [Golan, et al., 2000, 30] Imported foods which
meet the same health and safety standards as domestic foods can not be
singled out based on their country of origin. Country of origin labeling
was promoted by trade protectionists who sought to inflate the demand
for domestic goods in this manner. Commercially available biotech foods
currently meet the same health and safety standards as all other foods.
Hence, singling biotech foods out in this same manner is merely
chauvinism of a different shade, and would be inconsistent with previous
decisions like the rejection of country of origin labeling.

XI. Conclusion
If government action is only justified when it produces a net social
benefit, an adequate case has not been put forth for mandatory labeling of
genetically-modified foods. The arguments for mandatory labeling rest
on tenuous arguments and speculation. The apocalyptic projections of
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biotechnology opponents are mythological in scope and nearly as
fictional. While the net social benefit appears to clearly rest on the side
of aggressive application of biotechnology and voluntary labeling, a clear
and compelling case can be made for further research into biotechnology
to better define the costs and benefits of further genetic engineering. The
implicit and explicit costs of mandatory labeling appear to be a less
efficient use of public resources than an investment in better
understanding the consequences and benefits of biotechnology. We do
not know yet what we may find further down the rabbit hole of bioengineering, but the present evidence suggests the government should
leave the labels in Wonderland.
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